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Introduction: The Black Sea region gaining relevance
The crisis over South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia that took place in August
2008 highlights the volatility of the Black Sea region as a new flashpoint in the com-
mon neighbourhood between Russia and the European Union (EU). What has made
the conflict in Georgia so crucial to the EU is the fact that this is not to be seen as an
isolated occurrence. The incidence has repercussions throughout a region that is
marked by a plethora of challenges to political stability and democratic consolidation
–  factors that directly affect European security and welfare.
The Black Sea region is bound to grow not only in strategic importance but will also
come increasingly into the focus of public attention in the second decade of the 21st
century. In 2014 Russia will host the Olympic winter games in the Black Sea town of
Sochi in close proximity to the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia. The treaty
between Ukraine and Russia over the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol
runs out in 2017. Adding to this the persistence and recently demonstrated volatility
of unsolved frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, the Russian and European
attempts to introduce new energy infrastructure and pipelines and a shaky trajectory
for democracy in Georgia, Ukraine or Turkey, it becomes obvious why this region is
evolving into a complex and crucial focal point for European foreign policy.
Which states should be counted as “Black Sea states”is a difficult issue. Confining the
Black Sea regional concept in a strictly geographic sense to the littoral states Turkey,
Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia is obviously too narrow. Most defi-
nitions therefore include all southern Caucasus states (adding Azerbaijan and
Armenia) as well as Moldova sandwiched in between Ukraine and Romania.1
This paper takes a look at the overall and specific challenges that the EU faces in
dealing with the Black Sea region. The first section analyses the lack of a European
and a regional strategy for the Black Sea states and discusses the competing cogni-
tive labels that frame the Black Sea region’s politics. The second section analyses the
development of risks to stateness, democracy and economic prosperity in the region.
Drawing on both analyses, the paper concludes by drafting suggestions for EU poli-
cy to strengthen a pro-European regional identity as well as hedge against risks for
the Black Sea region.
1. The lack of a common cognitive approach to the Black Sea region
1.1. The relevance of the Black Sea region for the European Union
From a strategic point of view the Black Sea region derives most of its relevance from
its transit character, as an “energy corridor”between Europe and the Caspian Sea, as
well as a potential channel for illicit trafficking in persons, drugs, arms or as an access
point for marine military capacity (particularly from Russia’s perspective). In combi-
nation with the economic potential and its proximity to the EU this signifies a defi-
ning European interest in the Black Sea region. The trajectory of the Black Sea area
has direct implications for various dimensions of European security, including the
diversification of energy transportation routes, the avoidance of uncontrolled migra-
tion, organized crime and terrorism. Hence, the Black Sea region is of crucial strate-
gic importance for the EU for a number of reasons:
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– The risk of state failure in the Black Sea region is higher than in other parts of
the European neighbourhood. Yet today the region’s frozen conflicts serve as a
conduit for illegal trafficking into the European Union. Escalating conflicts would
increase migratory pressure toward the EU.
– The risk of failing transition to democracy and a market economy directly
affects the European Union’s stability interests in the region. Democratic coun-
tries that share the EU’s common values are more reliable and transparent part-
ners in security and economy issues and more likely to share its strategic goals.
– Economic market development in the Black Sea region is decisive with regard
to the reduction of asymmetries in quality of life between the European Union
and neighbouring states, as well as to the opportunities for EU-businesses.
These factors are interwoven with each other. Failure of stateness, escalation of fro-
zen conflicts and the proliferation of non-state actors or unrecognized political enti-
ties would have significant effects on energy supplies, trade and economic issues.
Furthermore, the EU faces a strategic dilemma as Russia is a major stakeholder in
numerous ways in the Black Sea region (in terms of military power and energy, as
well as with regard to soft power and public opinion).
While the accession of Romania and Bulgaria theoretically has brought the EU into
play as a direct Black Sea neighbour, the European clique’s policy toward the region
is still marked by fragmented perceptions of the regions’ problems and interests and
a lack of consensus over policy goals. Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus countries
are covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, while Turkey is an accession can-
didate and Russia enjoys a special relationship with the EU based on the EU-Russia
policy and the “Four Common Spaces”. In 2007 the European Union drafted a “Black
Sea Synergy” aiming at better addressing challenges in the region.2 However, this
strategy has not lived up to the challenges it identifies, as after a year most progress
has been restricted to the civil society dimension.3 The August 2008 crisis between
Georgia and Russia has also further highlighted the different policy priorities of EU
states toward the Black Sea states. While Poland, the Baltic states, Great Britain and
Sweden have become strong advocates of building closer ties between modernizing
countries such as Georgia and Ukraine and the EU and NATO whilst they have pur-
sued simultaneously a strategy of containment toward Russia, Germany and France
remain cautiously sceptical about an integration perspective for additional countries
and want to retain some form of strategic partnership with Russia, after the last
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement expired by the end of 2007.4
1.2. A politically constructed region: bound by risk and strategic relevance
rather than identity
As policy is derived from the way a certain region is seen, it is necessary to capture
the different cognitive approaches toward the Black Sea region, in order to define the
parameters affecting the policy of the EU toward it. Unlike the Balkans or the Baltic
Sea region, the Black Sea has not functioned as a common space with a specific
regional identity for over a hundred years. This has made it vulnerable to being la-
belled with identities from the outside or by dominant actors within or around the
region.5 As a result, regional definitions tend to be superimposed from the outside
in relation to other neighbouring regional actors. Numerous factors prevent a com-
mon Black Sea regional identity, including:
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– Crossroad-character of the Black Sea: A close look at the list of Black Sea states
shows the region’s character as a space of transition between other more salient-
ly conceived regions, such as the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Europe or in a
wider sense between Europe and Asia. This makes it difficult to attach a region-
ally encompassing label.6
– Cultural and linguistic differences: The Black Sea region covers a number of
different linguistic and cultural spaces that include such varying elements as
Turkic-Muslim to Russian-Orthodox and Armenian-Christian.
– Post-Soviet tensions: The Northern part of the Black Sea region remains marked
by the lasting repercussions of the fall of the Soviet Union in that political ten-
sions between Russia and former Soviet republics are aggravated by the ongoing
persistence of Soviet-era structures in economic realities.
– Supra-regional competition: During the Cold War, the Black Sea region was
once a frontline functioning as a clash zone between NATO in the South (Turkey)
and the USSR/Warsaw Pact in the North. This divisive label continues to frame
the security debate in the region, as NATO has been joined by Bulgaria and
Romania and is considering whether to initiate MAPs by Ukraine and Georgia.
While the Black Sea region has failed to develop a common identity, there are two
competing approaches for how to deal with it. Both approaches put the region into
a larger context of interests and values. The first puts the Black Sea region in relation
to a wider idea of bringing the states of the region closer to Europe, while the other
focuses on former Soviet power structures and the dominant role of today’s Russia.7
The European Union’s foreign policy to date has focused very strongly on enlarge-
ment and conditionality. This highlights a central aspect of the Black Sea region –
the way the region is related to “Europe”politically and ideally. Successful recogni-
tion as a “European”country opens up the principle possibility of accession and also
serves as a strong marker in identifying which trajectory domestic political and eco-
nomic transition a state should pursue. Consequently imagining the Black Sea
region as European “periphery”rather than an integral part of Europe subconscious-
ly increases the tendency among policymakers to tolerate signs of state and market
failure. The Black Sea region poses a strong challenge in this point, due to the com-
peting definitions of “Europe” one can find here. While almost all Black Sea states
claim a European identity, most of these European identities aren’t considered
without intra-EU controversy. Only Bulgaria and Romania are regarded as European
by consensus. Turkey is a controversial candidate for accession, while EU-policy
toward Russia is discussing whether to deal with it as a partner or rival.8 The other
Black Sea states are covered by the EU’s “Neighbourhood Policy”, which has blurred
the line between “European neighbours”and “neighbours of Europe”intentionally to
avoid any discussion of accession.9 An interesting debate is now raging over the
entry of Georgia and Ukrainie into the NATO. Seeing that the option of EU-mem-
bership is currently not open, both states’ governments are labelling their countries
members of transatlantic space, using it as a corollary to a European identity.
A competing approach to the Black Sea region is to understand the Black Sea area
in the context of Russia’s re-emergence as a regional power. The northern Black Sea
region (excluding EU-members Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Turkey) is viewed
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as an area of overlapping interests between the European Union and Russia.10 Since
–  as shown above –  the EU priorities in the region remain unclear, this perspective
favours Russian dominance that draws its motivation from the northern Black Sea
states’ status as former USSR republics, whose economies, political conflicts and
demographics can still be traced back to Soviet policy to a large extent. Vis-à-vis
these “Newly Independent States”in the near abroad Russia believes to hold “privi-
leged interests”.11 Acceptance among policymakers of the idea of the Black Sea
region as an intrinsic part of “post-Soviet space”or a Russian-dominated “near abroad”
that adheres to an authoritarian legacy might be the single largest challenge to
European support for democratic and free market reforms in the region.
1.3. The challenge of regional cooperation
As a result of these two very different ways of perceiving the region, the policy of the
Black Sea states mirror the interpretation of the region their policy makers prefer.
This was a more or less self-explanatory route for Bulgaria and Romania that are new
members of the European Union and aim at framing the entire Black Sea region as
a European space12. It is more difficult for Ukraine and Georgia that are facing mas-
sive pressure from Russia to reduce their ambitions of Western integration. The
regional interpretation states subscribe to also limits their options in cooperation to
either transatlantic-European institutions or close allegiance to Russia. As the
European Union has not yet developed a strong strategy toward the Black sea region
and in particular lacks a “grand vision” for the future of the region vis-à-vis itself
another there have been other attempts at cooperation and integration in the region,
even though none of these has ever reached a level of depth presented by European
integration. Approaches to regional cooperation are currently the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation, GUAM, Community of Democratic Choice and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.13
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation is an economic initiative established in 1992
by eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Mol-
dova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, which signed in Istanbul the Summit
Declaration and the Bosporus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC). With the accession of Serbia in 2004, the cooperation increased
to twelve. The multilateral political and economic initiative appeals to foster free-
dom, stability and prosperity in the region through economic cooperation. It there-
by combines all major Black Sea states regardless of their EU membership status.
However, throughout the years, the BSEC has failed to move beyond an exchange
between the heterogeneous interests of the members and is as a result considered
inefficient.
GUAM, the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development represent an
abbreviation for its member states of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova that
was first founded as a consultation round together with Uzbekistan that withdrew in
2005. A charter, signed in 2001, set an agreement of objectives such as democracy
promotion, ensuring stability in the region and assuring international and regional
security and with the aim of European Union membership. Turkey and Latvia enjoy
observer status. To a certain degree GUAM was to be a counter-weight to Russia
within the CIS and coordinate the interests of its members. However recently, the
strong aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine to the West have created a gap between
them and the other two members, effectively hampering GUAM.
Page 8 C·A·P Policy Analysis · 4 · 2008
Grotzky, Isic · The Black Sea Region
Weak identity,
weak integration
The Community of Democratic Choice is an international organization estab-
lished in 2005 by nine states (Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Republic of
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine) in the Ukrainian capital city
Kyiv. The United States and the European Union, among others, are observers. The
Community is aimed to promote democracy and human rights in the region be-
tween the three sees (Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea). Russia has explained imme-
diately after the foundation of the CDC that it views the community as a threat to
undermine the influence of Moscow in the region.14 Indeed, its inception date after
the colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and membership structure make this
a strong argument. While given Russian attempts to influence the outcome of
Ukraine’s 2004 election certainly offered states in the region a reason to turn West,
the exclusion of Russia from regional cooperation is also problematic.
Finally the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded first by
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and was later joined by most of the former republics of
the Soviet Union, though the Baltic States never did. In August 2008 after the dispute
in South Ossetia, Georgia withdrew from the CIS as a result of its military conflict
with Russia. The main aim of the CIS was to preserve the area of security and econo-
my as the Soviet Union had represented. Within the frame of the CIS Russia has
attempted to create a form of economic integration, which to date however has not
been attractive enough for the members to make it a top priority.The divergent devel-
opments in particular of Georgia and Ukraine have led to a drop in significance of the
CIS.
Concluding, regional cooperation has so far suffered from a lack of economic incen-
tives, divergent interests and the difficult challenge of engaging Russia as a state that
is increasingly seen by some of the region’s states’ as a threat to their freedom and
sovereignty. The fact that regional cooperation is so strongly a subject of the compe-
ting European and Post-Soviet approaches and its lack of regional identity thus are
confirmed in the failure to establish a consolidated format for regional cooperation
that includes all relevant actors.
2. The development of risks in the Black Sea region
After having investigated the cognitive framework for the Black Sea region, this
second section analyses the development of the states within the region over the
past few years relating to three key risk factors: stateness, democracy and economic
development. The development and prospects for all three indicators deeply affect
the European Union. In order to better illustrate both the regional development in
comparison to other former communist states, as well as with regard to European en-
largement, this section utilizes different index indicators that pit the Black Sea states’
development against a benchmark group consisting of Estonia, Latvia and Poland
which share similar communist and/or Soviet heritages and can thus be seen as a
comparative value to what the region’s potential is. Comparisons are then made be-
tween the benchmark group’s and the Black Sea states’rating average both with and
without EU-accession states.
2.1. The challenge of stateness
One of the major Black Sea regional challenges is the well functioning of state sover-
eignty. Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia are all parties to “frozen
conflicts”that date back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and have created pocket
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of unrecognized republics around the Black Sea area. The conflicts over Moldova’s
breakaway separatist region of Transnistria and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in
Georgia are further complicated by the presence of Russian so called “peacekeeping”
troops and Moscow’s continued interest in keeping the separatist situation unre-
solved in order to retain a pressure instrument towards its “near abroad”neighbours.
The recent military encounter between Georgia and Russia has clearly demonstrated
the risk that such “frozen conflicts”pose.
These conflicts are not all truly ethnic in origin and often fuelled by an amalgam of
local elite and business interests, as well as to some extent a Russian interest in keep-
ing a foot in the door of what has come to be known as the “near abroad”.15 How-
ever, the presence and categorisation of ethnic undertones in Georgia and Moldova
make long-term settlements all the more difficult. Both Ukraine and Turkey suffer
from more subtle disputes over state identity, Ukraine vis-à-vis its Russian and
Russian-speaking population, Turkey toward its large Kurdish minority. EU-mem-
bers Bulgaria and Romania have large Turkish and Hungarian minorities respective-
ly. Ethnic diversity, though not always nor automatically a point of contention, is a
defining characteristic of the risk structure around the Black Sea.
A functioning state that retains a monopoly over power is one of the main precon-
ditions for a stable democratic and free market transformation. The stateness ratings
contained within the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) are based on the average
of four questions that probe the state monopoly on the use of force, the legitimacy
of the state and titular nation among citizens, the impact of religious dogma on state
identity and the salience of a public administration structure.16 Ratings 10-9 indicate
a high consolidation of stateness, while 8-6 characterizes deficits of stateness, 5-3
significant challenges and 2-1 a lack of stateness characteristics. From this point of
view the regional average shows stateness deficiencies which become even more
obvious when the EU-members Bulgaria and Romania and EU-accession country
Turkey are excluded from the calculation. Georgia and Azerbaijan show the greatest
lack of state consolidation (Table 1). Compared to the benchmark group, the Black
Sea Region clearly lags behind.
Since the BTI is not an annual measurement, drawing on the “Failed States Index”
can give a more precise picture. This index has rated all Black Sea states except
Romania and Bulgaria with a “warning” label, one level below the highest “alert”
stage and shows regional stateness to be severely more endangered than the bench-
mark group (Table 2). In addition, it becomes clear that countries marred by “frozen
conflicts”have not shown strong improvement. Georgia’s recent conflict with Russia
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia are a case in point that such conflicts can heat up
without much warning for the international community.
2.2. The democratic challenge
In terms of democratic society the Black Sea states pose a true mosaic of different
developments and trajectories, though all of them suffer higher rates of corruption,
weaker civil society and less political stability than post-transition states in Central
Europe and the Baltics.
While they are genuine democracies, Bulgaria and Romania that joined the
European Union in 2007 still experience high levels of corruption and sporadic
political instability. Bulgaria has recently been chastised by the EU-Commission for
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embezzling EU-accession funds17, while Romania went through a crisis when its
government majority collapsed last year and the opposition impeached president
Basescu just to have him reinstated by popular referendum. Turkish democracy
remains fragile. While the ruling Islamist AK party has probably initiated more
reforms than any previous government the political system threatened to collapse in
summer 2008 when the constitutional court came close to banning the party which
just before received strong popular backing in elections.
Hopes that Georgia and Ukraine would become stable democracies in the follow-up
to the “colour revolutions” in 2003 and 2004 respectively have disappointed.
Ukrainian politics has turned out three different parliaments and five governments
since 2004. The country’s constitution that has both a directly elected president and
a parliament is constantly being re-interpreted for power struggles between the pro-
Western and pro-Russian camp, as well as between reformist Prime Minister
Timoshenko and President Yushchenko, making the country suffer a political stale-
mate. In Georgia, usually considered the most democratic and Western-oriented
state in the Caucasus, the situation has become extremely difficult. The use of police
force against opposition protests and ensuing short-term restrictions on media cast
doubts over Saakashwili’s democratic credentials. Both the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in 2008 were criticized by the OSCE, in particular for the misuse
of “administrative resources” in aiding the government party, though they did meet
most of the OSCE’s requirements and elections to parliament showed improvements
vis-à-vis the presidential poll. While the country’s political classes experienced a
“rally-round-the-flag” effect during Russia’s military incursion it is quite probable
that Georgia faces a turbulent debate over the role of president Saakashwili in trig-
gering the events of August 2008 for the months to come.18
Armenia and Moldova are both increasingly under the sway of Russian politics and
continue to show major democracy deficits.19 The Armenian 2007 parliamentary
elections were described by the OSCE as flawed, though showing improvements.20
While parliamentary elections in Moldova in 2007 were considered an improvement
with previous ones on 2003, abuses particularly during the electoral campaign
remain and presidential control of all government branches is still strong.21
In Russia and Azerbaijan political institutions are used to preserve elite power rather
than guarantee free and fair competition. The change in Russia’s presidential office
from Vladimir Putin to Dmitri Medvedev or of Heidar Aliyev to his son Ilham Aliyev
in Azerbaijan were carefully orchestrated transfers of power, which left the public
without any choice. Media and civil society are controlled and partially repressed,
opposition parties marginal. Not coincidentally both countries are rich in fossil fuel
resources that serve as a foundation for state power.22
The gap in democracy and civil society to other post-transition European countries
is clearly visible in all ratings. The BTI scores show strong deficiencies in democracy
on a regional average with only Romania and Bulgaria performing close to satisfac-
tory and a clear gap between non-EU Black Sea states and the benchmark group.
What is more, a number of states show little or no improvement in democracy, in
particular Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia (Table 3).
A look at one of the best known democracy ratings worldwide, the annual Freedom
in the World Report, consolidates these findings (Table 4). Aside from Bulgaria and
Romania, only Ukraine has recently received a “free”rating with all other Black Sea
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states either “partly free” or “not free”. As there is little dynamic in most country’s
ratings over the past years the negative development of democracy ratings for
Georgia has had a downward effect on the region as a whole. The democracy gap is
particular strong when comparing the benchmark group with Black Sea states
without an EU-perspective.
2.3. The economic challenge
From an economic viewpoint the Black Sea region is characterized on the one side
by high growth rates and on the other by difficulties in implementing schemes of a
market place as inward environment of the economic system.
Owing in part to classical convergence resulting from playing catch-up with estab-
lished economies, the region’s states have shown strong economic growth during
the past years (Table 5). As Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have slowed in growth, the
Caucasus states have surged, with Azerbaijan taking a momentous lead given its oil
boom. At the same time, a slowdown for Moldova does not signal well for Europe’s
poorest country. Besides, the Ukrainian economy still seems volatile to sudden drops
in growth, while Russia looks stable.
Bulgaria and Romania take pride in being part of the European Union’s single mar-
ket. Despite high rates of economic growth23 the youngest EU-member states still
suffer a need for reforms. Bulgaria is planning the introduction of the Euro by 2012,
Romania by 2014, but in order to implement this idea both states will need to com-
bat their high inflation rates and national debt to be able to conform to the European
Monetary System. At the moment, the average income of both states reaches a third
of the average income of the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are still combating corrup-
tion and the frailties of judicial systems. At the same time, the youngest member sta-
tes of the European Union are creating attractive terms for foreign investement. In
Bulgaria, the corporate tax amounts about 10 per cent (Germany 15 per cent, EU-
Average 13,8 per cent),24 which is the lowest quotation in the European Union after
Cyprus. In Romania, the construction and the services sectors are growing. The con-
struction sector doubled to 33,6% from 2007 to 2008.25
Georgia and Ukraine have shown signs of a revival of business after the breakdown
of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian economy has been expanding, with GDP at 7.3%
in 2007, especially in trade and transport industries. The Georgian success story has
now been disturbed due to the escalation of its disputes with Russia, but previously
in 2007, Georgia’s economic growth rate added up to 12.4%. A year before, the World
Bank had called Georgia the “top-reformer 2006”. In fact, the country has pursued a
course of privatization that includes the Georgian power supply system Energopro
(taken on by a Czech company), the harbour of Batumi (now in Kazakh hands) and
the Bank Republic (owned by France’s Société Générale). After the recent clashes
with Russia, it remains to be seen how the economy will react on the Russian boy-
cotts, which last since 2006 and probably won’t be reversed for an indefinite time.
Contemporaneously, the Western foreign investors are avoiding doing risk invest-
ment in Georgia until the conflict situation in South Ossetia is dissolving. Therefore,
the Georgian economy will certainly have to rebuild investor confidence.26
Strong Russian economic growth has been driven by high energy prices, a high pri-
vate consumption and growing domestic as well as foreign investment rates. Russia
is one of the top producers of energy in the world with more than 1/3 of the world-
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wide gas in reserve and about 7% of the global oil occurrences. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) is expecting the Russian economic power to double until 2013,
becoming one of the world’s five largest economies by 2018. However, the war with
Georgia has led to a massive withdrawal of foreign capital that has added to an al-
ready difficult situation for Russia’s economy due to the global financial crisis. Also,
inflation rates of about 15% are bringing prices up, which in the long-term might
reduce political support for the government. Another problem is the dependence on
the energy prices. While Russia has surged both economically and politically due to
rising oil and gas prices, these have recently been falling again. Added to that, the
Russian exchange was not escaped by the current crisis of the American financial
market. The cash injection of about 13.8 billion Euro for the Russian capital market,
released by President Medvedev after the breakdown of the American bank compa-
ny in the middle of September will not change the obvious circumstances.27 Russia
needs to diversify its industry and support more high-tech and innovation busi-
nesses in order to sustain its current economic dynamic.
Many countries in the Black Sea region rely heavily on their role as an energy transit
or energy producing country. Armenia and Georgia for example are relatively small
producers and consumers of energy, but host important oil and gas transit routes.The
second largest oil pipeline, the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), invented and con-
structed by US-companies, passes through Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia and
flows about 1.2 barrel oil per day. The status of being a transit country is a curse and
a bliss at one go. On the one hand the countries gain territorial strategic relevance,
which entails conflict potential to the fact, that somehow transit areas are always
hotly contested regions – from energy exporters as well as energy importers. On the
other hand being a transit country assures current receipts to the treasury and imparts
certain advantages when it comes to negotiations – economic and political of course.
Currently, the Black Sea region still remains below its economic potential. As strong
growth in most economies helps create a more affluent middle class one branch of
industry that could be revitalized is tourism. But while the town of Sukhumi in
Abkhazia was known as the “Côte d’Azur”of the Soviet Union, today the region is
known for its territorial conflicts. Also, the proximity of EU-members Bulgaria and
Romania will not led to the rest of the Black Sea region profiting from growing closer
to EU markets, as long as relations in particular between Russia and its neighbours
remain strained.
Looking at the BTI market economy status (Table 6), which registers factors such as
markets and competition, currency, private property regimes and welfare, the eco-
nomic situations in the Black Sea region remains various. While EU-members
Bulgaria and Romania have shown improvements, as well as Turkey, this does not
hold true for the spanning regional development.The “colour revolutions”in Georgia
and Ukraine have not automatically led to economic reform, Georgia has improved,
but Ukraine declined in its ratings. Oil- and gas-powered Russia and Azerbaijan
continue to score badly, as well.
A further development that is even more worrisome is a consistently growing gap in
corruption levels between the Black Sea region and the benchmark group as regis-
tered by the Corruption Perception Index (Table 7). While Romania and Bulgaria
seem to be reducing or at least stagnating at disappointing levels of corruption and
Turkey has improved its ratings, the year 2008 has brought a downturn in a whole
number of Black Sea states including Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
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With regard to free market entrepreneurship the Black Sea region is on the way to
become a more accommodating place for business, nevertheless with the occasional
glitch. The time required to start a business as measured by the World Bank in days
shows: the states of the Southern Caucasus have all eased up on businesses, in par-
ticular Azerbaijan and Georgia, but the cut of bureaucracy in Russia is sluggish and
economic progress in Ukraine clearly lags behind that of Georgia (Table 8).
3. Answering the challenges: Democratic governance, civil society,
regional cooperation and European soft power
The analysis of the cognitive conception of the Black Sea region and an overview of
the regional progress in the three key risk segments of stateness, democracy and
economic development allow for the following conclusions:
– Stateness: Excluding the EU member or accession states reveals that deficient or
threatened stateness is the norm for most Black Sea countries. Frozen conflicts
and politicized ethnicity contain various risks for escalation. These risks are
enhanced by the lack of common identity and risk perception among several
Black Sea states. This is particularly true vis-à-vis Russia, as the conflicts suffer
from the lack of neutral arbitration.
– Democracy: The “colour revolutions” in Ukraine in Georgia have not automat-
ically led to a stable and successful development in both democracy and market
economy. Even thought Ukraine has improved its rating concerning democracy,
the economic framework remains shaky. Furthermore corruption ratings have
shown stagnation in the last years. Georgia has been able to improve its market
economy scores and fight against corruption, but has experienced a drop in its
democracy rating. Democracy is most stable and/or promising, where a European
perspective is offered.
– Economic development: The region shows high economic growth rates, but still
suffers from a lack of industrial diversification. Regional fragmentation hurts the
potenital for the commerce. At the same time, economic growth often does not
build on free market structures and instead relies on the energy export industry,
thus carrying the risk of dependency on the world’s resource prices. In addition,
Russia and Azerbaijan in particular do not show much improvement in democ-
racy and free market conditions, yet retain high rates of growth, there seems to
be little connection between democratic governance and growth. This is a risk
that interweaves with democratic development.
Looking at the future challenges for the Black Sea region, three core points stand out
to be significantly important for the development of the region: strengthening state
institutions through democratic elites and civil society, ensuring dialogue between
all Black Sea states including Russia and encouraging the view of the Black Sea area
as a European region by means of promoting European “soft power”.
Civil society: The main risk to the Black Sea region is a breakdown of stateness.
State stability depends on a number of factors, which include stable democratic insti-
tutions and conflict prevention. Yet the long-term effectiveness of institutions and
solving regional conflicts depends on the commitment of political, economic and
societal elites. Their function should be to ensure free and fair competition of inter-
ests while subordinating personal and professional ambitions to the rule of law. In
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turn, this requires strong civil societies in all Black Sea states. Furthermore, active
civil societies will strengthen the internal decision-making process and make the
countries in the region, particularly those in Russia’s “near abroad” less respondent
to external influences. With Romania and Bulgaria as EU members, the European
Neighbourhood Policy was strengthened and its regional assistance instruments
became more diversified. The EU has already taken steps toward to offer more sup-
port for civil society groups and NGOs in the Black Sea region. Regional networks
are also important for developing and promoting the democratisation in the Black
Sea area. There have been different regional initiatives of civil society organisations,
which have developed tools concerning peace-building, democratic reforms, media,
youth, small businesses and education. There is no question about the positive effect
of civil society action on stability. But the democratic breakthrough is never at the
end of the democratization process and requires further consolidation.28
Cooperation and engaging Russia: The second core issue to stabilize the Black Sea
region will be to enhance regional cooperation and simultaneously to enclude
Russia. This point is a challenge, because there are currently a number of strong ten-
sions, in particular between Russia and Georgia and Russia and Ukraine. However,
the region’s security and energy issues will not be solvable without Russia at the
negotiation table. There is a need for cooperation of Russia with the regional actors
to prevent the area from further separations and domestic as well as foreign ten-
sions. A first step would be to re-energize the communication between Russia and
its neighbours. If Russia’s self-understanding remains that of a regional hegemony
in the region with the aim to defend its “national interests”, a non-confrontational
way should be pursued.29 The European Union as well as the states belonging to the
Black Sea area should take this to the heart and insist on an agreement with Russia
to ensure safety in the region and establish lasting instruments of international
peace keeping.
European soft power: Finally, the European Union must realize that it is not only
facing a competition over energy transit routes or trade integration in the Black Sea
region, but also one over hearts and minds. The current European policy toward
most of the Black Sea states within the frame of ENP has not signalized strong readi-
ness and engagement toward EU accession by Ukraine and Georgia. The lack of a
strategy for the Eastern neighbourhood30 and the failure to recognize Black Sea states
as distinctly European risks in the long-term to discourage those among policy
makers and elites who adhere strongly to values of democracy and the rule of law.
Simultaneously, the domestic development of states such as Russia or Azerbaijan
offer a very different blueprint for modernization, based on the centralization of state
power and curtailing of liberal rights that will become increasingly attractive for
ruling elites the less probable a the path to Europe looks like.Therefore the European
Union must take more active measures in promoting its own model of the rule of law
and democracy – both in order to support its own strategic interests in the region as
well as to underline its principle commitment to such values.
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Annex 
 
Table 1: Data taken from Bertelsmann Transformation Index surveys (2006 
and 2008), available at: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de 
 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
stateness ratings (max. Positive rating: 10) 
 2006 2008 
Armenia 8,8 8,8 
Azerbaijan  6,8 6,8 
Bulgaria 9,3 9,5 
Georgia 5,3 6,8 
Moldova 6,5 8,0 
Romania 9,3 9,5 
Russia 7,5 8,0 
Turkey 7,8 7,8 
Ukraine 8,0 8,8 
Regional Average 7,7 8,2 
Regional average excluding Bu, Ro, Tu 7,15 7,87 
Benchmark 
Estonia 9,3 9,5 
Latvia 8,8 9,5 
Poland 9,8 9,8 
Average 9,3 9,6 
Average difference 1,6 1,3 
Average difference excluding Bu, Ro, Tu 2,15 1,66 
 
  
Table 2: The Fund for Peace: Failing States Index Scores (2005-2008), 
Ratings available at: http://www.fundforpeace.org 
 
Failed States Index 
low scores signify low risk of state failure 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Armenia N/A 70,9 70,3 70,7 
Azerbaijan  85,7 81,9 81,2 81 
Bulgaria N/A 62,1 60,3 58,5 
Georgia N/A 82,2 82,3 83,8 
Moldova N/A 82,5 85,7 85,7 
Romania N/A 62,6 60,9 59,9 
Russia 83,5 87,1 81,2 79,7 
Turkey 86 74,4 74,9 75,4 
Ukraine 88,8 72,9 71,4 70,8 
Regional average N/A 75,7 74,7 74,4 
Regional average excluding 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey N/A 81,3 80,3 80,2 
Benchmark 
Estonia N/A 51 50,5 51 
Latvia N/A 56,2 56,7 54,5 
Poland N/A 47,9 47,6 47,6 
Average N/A 51,7 51,6 51,0 
Average difference N/A 24,0 23,1 23,4 
Average difference excluding 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
N/A 29,6 28,7 29,2 
 
 
  
 
Table 3: Data taken from Bertelsmann Transformation Index surveys (2006 
and 2008), available at: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de 
 
BTI democracy status scores 
high scores show high consolidation degree of democracy 
 2006 2008 
Armenia 6,1 6,0 
Azerbaijan  3,8 3,8 
Bulgaria 8,5 8,7 
Georgia 6,1 6,9 
Moldova 5,4 6,9 
Romania 8,2 8,6 
Russia 5,7 5,4 
Turkey 7,1 7,1 
Ukraine 7,1 7,4 
Regional average 6,4 6,8 
Regional average excluding 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 5,7 6,1 
Benchmark 
Estonia 9,4 9,6 
Latvia 8,3 8,7 
Poland 9,2 8,8 
Average 9,0 9,0 
Average difference 2,6 2,2 
Average difference excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
3,3 2,9 
 
 
Table 4: Freedom House: Freedom in the World (2005-2008), Ratings 
available at: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008 
 
Freedom House: Freedom in the World 
Average of political and civil liberties 
(2,5< free, 2,5> partly free, >xx< not free) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Armenia 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 
Azerbaijan  5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 
Bulgaria 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Georgia 3,5 3,0 3,0 4,0 
Moldova 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 
Romania 2,5 2,0 2,0 2,0 
Russia 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 
Turkey 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 
Ukraine 3,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 
Regional average 3,7 3,4 3,4 3,6 
Regional average excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 4,3 4,1 4,1 4,3 
Benchmark 
Estonia 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 
Latvia 1,5 1,0 1,0 1,5 
Poland 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 
Average 1,2 1,0 1,0 1,2 
Average difference 2,5 2,4 2,4 2,4 
Average difference excluding 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: World bank Quick Query selected from World Development 
Indicators, accessed via http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/ 
member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 
 
Annual GDP growth 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Armenia 10% 14% 13% 14% 
Azerbaijan  10% 26% 34% 19% 
Bulgaria 7% 6% 6% 6% 
Georgia 6% 9% 10% 12% 
Moldova 7% 8% 5% 3% 
Romania 8% 4% 8% 6% 
Russia 7% 6% 7% 8% 
Turkey 9% 8% 7% 4% 
Ukraine 12% 3% 7% 7% 
Regional average 8% 9% 11% 9% 
Regional average excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 9% 11% 13% 11% 
 
Estonia 8% 10% 11% 7% 
Latvia 9% 11% 12% 10% 
Poland 5% 4% 6% 7% 
Average 7% 8% 10% 8% 
Average difference 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Average difference excluding 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
2% 3% 3% 2% 
 
 
Table 6: Data taken from Bertelsmann Transformation Index surveys (2006 
and 2008), available at: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de 
 
BTI market economy status scores 
high scores show high consolidation degree of market economy 
 2006 2008 
Armenia 6,4 6,8 
Azerbaijan  5,2 5,2 
Bulgaria 7,5 8,2 
Georgia 5,4 6,4 
Moldova 4,7 5,0 
Romania 7,6 8,1 
Russia 6,6 6,5 
Turkey 6,8 7,3 
Ukraine 6,8 6,5 
Regional average 6,3 6,7 
Regional average excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 5,9 6,1 
Benchmark 
Estonia 9,2 9,3 
Latvia 8,1 8,5 
Poland 8,6 8,7 
Average 8,6 8,8 
Average difference 2,3 2,1 
Average difference excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
2,7 2,7 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 7: Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by Transparency 
International, available online at: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
 
Corruption Perception Index  
low scores signify high corruption 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Armenia 3,1 2,9 2,9 3 
Azerbaijan  1,9 2,2 2,4 2,1 
Bulgaria 4,1 4 4 4,1 
Georgia 2 2,3 2,8 3,4 
Moldova 2,3 2,9 3,2 2,8 
Romania 2,9 3 3,1 3,7 
Russia 2,8 2,4 2,5 2,3 
Turkey 3,2 3,5 3,8 4,1 
Ukraine 2,2 2,6 2,8 2,7 
Regional average 2,7 2,9 3,1 3,1 
Regional average excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 2,4 2,6 2,8 2,7 
Benchmark 
Estonia 6 6,4 6,7 6,5 
Latvia 4 4,2 4,7 4,8 
Poland 3,5 3,4 3,7 4,2 
Average 4,5 4,7 5,0 5,2 
Average difference 1,8 1,8 2,1 2,3 
Average difference excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
2,1 2,1 2,4 2,7 
 
 
Table 8: World bank Quick Query selected from World Development 
Indicators, accessed via http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/ 
member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 
 
Time required to start a business (days) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Armenia 25 19 18 18 
Azerbaijan  123 114 52 30 
Bulgaria 32 32 32 32 
Georgia 25 21 16 11 
Moldova 30 30 30 23 
Romania 28 11 11 14 
Russia 36 34 29 29 
Turkey 9 6 6 6 
Ukraine 34 34 33 27 
Regional average 38 33 25 21 
Regional average excluding  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 46 42 30 23 
 
Estonia 72 35 35 7 
Latvia 16 16 16 16 
Poland 31 31 31 31 
Average 40 27 27 18 
Average difference +2 -6 +2 -3 
Average difference excluding 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 
-6 -15 -3 -5 
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